

## (Royal Commission of Inquiry into the terrorist attack on Christchurch, 2020)

### Executive summary

## In this part

---

Executive summary

---

### Consolidated findings

---

Summary of recommendations

---

# Consolidated findings

## What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist

2 *Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist* sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.

3 “The terrorist attack” means the terrorist attack carried out by the individual in accordance with his planning and preparation over the previous years.

4 **We find that:**

1. The only information about the individual that was known by New Zealand Public sector agencies before 15 March 2019 that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack was the email sent by the individual to the Parliamentary Service.
2. The Parliamentary Service acted appropriately within a period of time that was reasonable in the circumstances in response to the email sent just before the terrorist attack.
3. There was no other information provided or otherwise available to any relevant Public sector agency that could or should have alerted them to the terrorist attack.
4. There was no failure in information sharing between the relevant Public sector agencies.

# Assessing the counter-terrorism effort

5 P. *Part 8: Assessing the counter-terrorism effort sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.*

6 We conclude that the concentration of counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism before the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service's baselining project began in 2018 was inappropriate because it:

1. was not based on an informed assessment of the threats of terrorism associated with other ideologies; and

P. 2. *did not result from a system-wide decision that, despite the absence of such an assessment, counter-terrorism resources should continue to be allocated almost exclusively to the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.*

7 **We find that:**

1. the inappropriate concentration of resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism did not contribute to the individual's planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected. And for that reason, the Public sector agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort did not fail to anticipate or plan for the terrorist attack due to an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources.

P. 2. *no Public sector agency involved in the counter-terrorism effort failed to meet required standards or was otherwise at fault in respects that were material to the individual's planning and preparation for his terrorist attack not being detected.*

Read Part 8: Assessing the counter-terrorism effort

## The firearms licence

8 *Part 5: The firearms licence sets out the evidence and rationale for our findings.*

**We find that:**

Q. *New Zealand Police failed to meet required standards in the administration of the firearms licensing system in that:*

1. the Arms Manual, the Master Vetting Guide and the Firearms Licence Vetting Guide did not provide coherent and complete guidance as to the processing of applications where the applicant could not provide a near-relative referee able to be interviewed in person;

2. New Zealand Police did not put in place arrangements to ensure that firearms licensing staff received systematic training and regular reviews of their practice; and

3. in dealing with the individual's firearms licence application, New Zealand Police did not adequately address the issue whether gaming friend and their parent knew the individual well enough to serve as referees.

# Summary of recommendations

- 1 Our Terms of Reference directed us to make any recommendations we considered appropriate on the following:
  - 5
    - a) whether there is any improvement to information gathering, sharing, and analysis practices by relevant [Public] sector agencies that could have prevented the terrorist attack, or could prevent such terrorist attacks in the future, including, but not limited to, the timeliness, adequacy, effectiveness, and co-ordination of information disclosure, sharing, or matching between relevant [Public] sector agencies; and
    - b) what changes, if any, should be implemented to improve relevant [Public] sector agency systems, or operational practices, to ensure the prevention of such terrorist attacks in the future; and
    - c) any other matters relevant to the above, to the extent necessary to provide a complete report.
- 2 Our recommendations are set out in Part 10: Recommendations and address the following areas:
  - Q.
    - a) Improving New Zealand's counter-terrorism effort.
    - b) Improving New Zealand's firearms licensing system.
    - c) Supporting the ongoing recovery needs of affected whānau, survivors and witnesses of the 15 March 2019 terrorist attack.
    - d) Improving New Zealand's response to our increasingly diverse population.
  - P.
    - e) Implementation of the recommendations.
- 3 The recommendations are also organised by four themes.
- 4 **Strong government leadership and direction are required** to provide effective oversight and accountability of the counter-terrorism effort. This will ensure that roles and responsibilities are well understood across Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery at the national, regional and local levels and resources are appropriately focused.
- 5 Strong government leadership and direction are also required to position New Zealand (and in particular the Public sector) to respond and adapt to New Zealand's increasingly diverse population and to effect the social shift that over time will help to achieve a safe and inclusive New Zealand.
- 6 **Engaged and accountable government decision-making** will enable Public sector policies, programmes and services to be designed and delivered that meet the requirements of New Zealand's increasingly diverse society. The Public sector (and in particular the agencies involved in the counter-terrorism effort) needs to change how they engage with communities. The Public sector mindset must shift to value communities' input into decisions, transparency and engaging in robust debate.
- 7 **Everyone in society has a role in making New Zealand safe and inclusive** but there is no common understanding of what those roles are, how they relate to each other and what they should be seeking to achieve. Clarity of roles

## Executive summary

### In this part

---

Executive summary

---

Consolidated findings

---

**Summary of recommendations**

---