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Political
arrangements

WHAT'S THE HURRY?



WHAT'S THE HURRY?

Urgency in the New Zealand Legislative Process
1987–2010

Claudia Geiringer, Polly Higbee and Elizabeth McLeay

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	Voted Yes	Voted No	Abstained	No vote cast	Total
New Zealand First					
National coalition 1996–1998 (until demise of coalition)	17	0	0	0	17
Labour confidence and supply 2005–2008	8	0	0	0	8
Alliance					
Labour coalition 1999–2002	21	0	0	0	21
Greens					
Labour confidence and supply 1999–2002 ⁴⁰	17	3	1	0	21
Labour agreement not to “oppose” on confidence and supply 2005–2008 ⁴¹	4	2	2	0	8
Progressives					
Labour coalition 2002–2005	15	0	0	3	18
Labour coalition 2005–2008	8	0	0	0	8
United Future					
Labour confidence and supply 2002–2005	14	4	0	0	18
Labour confidence and supply 2005–2008	6	2	0	0	8
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	23	0	0	0	23
ACT Party					
National confidence and supply August 1998–1999 (unwritten)	12	1	0	0	13
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	22	0	0	1	23
Māori Party					
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	20	0	2	1	23

40 A written agreement was drafted but never signed: Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “The History of the Green Party” (2011) <www.greens.org.nz>; Jonathan Boston and Stephen Church, “Government Formation after the 2002 General Election” in Jonathan Boston and others (eds), *New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002* (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2003) 333 at 343.

41 “The Green Party agrees to provide stability to a Labour/Progressive coalition government by cooperating on agreed policy and budget initiatives and not opposing confidence or supply for the term of this Parliament”: Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, “Labour-led Government Cooperation Agreement with Greens” (press release, 17 October 2005) <www.greens.org.nz>.