WHAT'S THE HURRY?

Political arrangements
WHAT'S THE HURRY?

Urgency in the New Zealand Legislative Process
1987–2010

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1 Legislatures should allow time and opportunity for informed and open policy deliberation  
2 The legislative process should allow sufficient time and opportunity for the adequate scrutiny of bills  
3 Citizens should be able to participate in the legislative process  
4 Parliaments should operate in a transparent manner  
5 The House should strive to produce high quality legislation  
6 Legislation should not jeopardise fundamental constitutional rights and principles  
7 Parliaments should follow stable procedural rules  
8 Parliament should foster, not erode, respect for itself as an institution  
9 The government has a right to govern, so long as it commands a majority in the House  
10 Parliament should be able to enact legislation quickly in (actual) emergency situations  

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