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Political arrangements

WHAT'S THE HURRY?

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Urgency in the New Zealand Legislative Process 1987–2010

Claudia Geiringer, Polly Higbee and Elizabeth McLeay

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Table of Contents

List of Figures and Tables ix

Acknowledgements xi

Chapter One: Introduction 1

I Methods and Data 6

A The Statistical Data 8

B The Interviews 10

II Overview and Summary 11

III The Principles of Good Law-Making 15

A The Ten Principles 16

1 Legislatures should allow time and opportunity for informed and open policy deliberation 16

2 The legislative process should allow sufficient time and opportunity for the adequate scrutiny of bills 16

3 Citizens should be able to participate in the legislative process 17

4 Parliaments should operate in a transparent manner 17

5 The House should strive to produce high quality legislation 18

6 Legislation should not jeopardise fundamental constitutional rights and principles 18

7 Parliaments should follow stable procedural rules 19

8 Parliament should foster, not erode, respect for itself as an institution 19

9 The government has a right to govern, so long as it commands a majority in the House 19

10 Parliament should be able to enact legislation quickly in (actual) emergency situations 19

B Conclusion 19

Chapter Two: Urgency and the Legislative Process 21

I The Origins and Historical Development of Urgency 22

II The Procedures for Invoking Urgency 23

III The Effect of Urgency Motions 25
A The House's Sitting Hours and their Extension under Urgency 25
1 The effect of (ordinary) urgency on the House's sitting hours 27
2 The effect of extraordinary urgency on the House's sitting hours 28
B Suspension of Other Business of the House 28
C Removal of Legislative "Stand-Down" Periods 29
D Omission of Select Committee Consideration 31
IV What Urgency Does Not Do 32
V Roles and Responsibilities 32
A The Leader of the House 32
B The Speaker 33
C The Party Whips 34
D The Business Committee 35
E The Standing Orders Committee 36
VI Urgency and the Allocation of Parliamentary Time 36
VII Urgency in Comparative Perspective 40
VIII Conclusion 44

Chapter Three: The Reasons Why Governments Use Urgency 45
I The Formal Requirement to Give Reasons 46
II Why New Zealand Governments Use Urgency: Searching for the Reasons 48
A Specific Reasons to Expedite the Passage of Particular Legislation 48
1 Minimising opportunities for speculative behaviour by market participants and providing certainty for financial markets 48
2 Responding to an unexpected event 50
3 Correcting errors 52
4 Urgency driven by an external (or pre-set) deadline 53
B Freeing up the Order Paper 54
C Tactical Reasons for Using Urgency 57

1 Strategic urgency to manage public sentiment 57
2 Tactical reasons unrelated to the legislative agenda 59
D Budget Day Urgency 61
III Conclusion 65

Chapter Four: How Governments Use Urgency 67
I Parliaments, Governments and the Use of Urgency 68
A Urgency Motions 68
B Bills Accorded Urgency 70
C Percentage of Sitting Time Taken under Urgency 70
D Trends in the Data 74
II Different Types of Urgency 75
A Taking Only One Stage under Urgency 77
B Removing the Stand-Down Period between Introduction and Initial Debate 77
C Urgency for Remaining Stages 77
D Taking Committee of the Whole House and Third Reading Together 78
E Bills Taken Through All Stages and/or Bills Not Sent to Select Committee 78
III Extraordinary Urgency 84
IV Seasonal Patterns in the Use of Urgency 84
V Policy Areas of Bills Accorded Urgency 88
VI Conclusion 90

Chapter Five: The Constraints on the Use of Urgency 91
I Extraordinary Urgency 92
II (Ordinary) Urgency 93
A Internal Factors that Can Constrain Urgency 94
B External Factors that Can Constrain Urgency 97
III Getting the Numbers – The Impact of Multi-Party Parliaments on the Use of Urgency 99
A The Lead-Up to MMP (1993–1996) 103
B The First MMP Government (1996–1999) 103
C The Labour-led Governments (1999–2008) 105

D The National-led Government (2008–2010) 109
E Conclusions on the Impact of Multi-Party Parliaments 112
IV Urgency and Evolving Parliamentary Culture 115
V Ideology, Personality and Internalised Constraints 119
VI Conclusion 121

Chapter Six: Urgency, Time and Democratic Legitimacy 123
I Time and the Legislative Process 124
A Does the House Have Insufficient Capacity to Process Government Business? 124
B Possible Solutions 130
1 Extending the House's sitting hours 130
2 Streamlining the House's business 132
C Urgency as a Tool for Making Progress 139
II Urgency and Democratic Legitimacy 139
III Conclusion 146

Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Options for Reform 149
I A Review of Parliamentary Time? 150
II Separate Provision for Extended Hours 151
III Reserving Urgency for Urgent Situations 153
IV Additional Controls for Elimination of Select Committee Stage 157
V Possibilities for Future Reform of the Standing Orders 160
VI The Term of Parliament 161
VII Conclusion 162

The Research Team 165

Appendix A: List of Interviewees and Interview Topics 167
I List of Interviewees 167
A MPs and Former MPs 167
B Clerks of the House of Representatives 167
II Topics Covered in the Interviews 168

Appendix B: Bills Not Sent to Select Committee 1996–2010 171

Appendix C: Portfolio Groupings 175

Figures and Tables

Figures

4.1 Urgency Motions Moved by Year 1987–2010 69
4.2 Urgency Motions Moved by Parliament 1987–2010 69
4.3 Bills Accorded Urgency (Attributed to Year of Introduction) 1987–2010 71
4.4 Bills Accorded Urgency by Parliament 1987–2010 71
4.5 Percentage of Bills Introduced that Were Accorded Urgency by Parliament 1987–2010 72
4.6 Percentage of Total Sitting Hours Taken under Urgency by Parliament 1987–2010 73
4.7 Bills not Sent to Select Committee by Year 1987–2010 80
4.8 Bills Accorded Urgency with No Select Committee Stage by Parliament 1987–2010 80
4.9 Bills Accorded Urgency by Year of Electoral Cycle 1987–2010 85
4.10 Bills Accorded Urgency First Six Months of New Parliament 1987–2010 86
4.11 Average Number of Urgency Motions by Month 1987–2010 87
4.12 Bills Accorded Urgency by Portfolio Areas 1987–2010 88
5.1 Question Time Provided for at the Time of Urgency Motion 1987–2010 118
5.2 Leave not Sought for Question Time when Urgency Motion Moved (Urgency for Three Days or More) 119

Tables

1.1 Parliaments and Governments 1987–2010 20
4.1 Percentage of Bills Introduced that Were Accorded Urgency by Parliament 1987–2010 72
4.2 Percentage of Total Sitting Hours Taken under Urgency by Parliament 1987–2010 73
4.3 Stages Taken under Urgency by Year 76
4.4 Bills Not Sent to Select Committee by Parliament and Category 1996–2010 83

5.1 Support Parties' Voting Patterns on Urgency Motions after 1996 101
5.2 Bills Passed Through All Stages and Bills Not Sent to Select Committee (Highest Post-1993 Years) 110
6.1 Parliamentary Sitting Hours 2008 128

Table 5.1: Support Parties' Voting Patterns on Urgency Motions after 1996

	Voted Yes	Voted No	Abstained	No vote cast	Total
New Zealand First					
National coalition 1996–1998 (until demise of coalition)	17	0	0	0	17
Labour confidence and supply 2005–2008	8	0	0	0	8
Alliance					
Labour coalition 1999–2002	21	0	0	0	21
Greens					
Labour confidence and supply 1999–2002[40]	17	3	1	0	21
Labour agreement not to "oppose" on confidence and supply 2005–2008[41]	4	2	2	0	8
Progressives					
Labour coalition 2002–2005	15	0	0	3	18
Labour coalition 2005–2008	8	0	0	0	8
United Future					
Labour confidence and supply 2002–2005	14	4	0	0	18
Labour confidence and supply 2005–2008	6	2	0	0	8
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	23	0	0	0	23
ACT Party					
National confidence and supply August 1998–1999 (unwritten)	12	1	0	0	13
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	22	0	0	1	23
Māori Party					
National confidence and supply 2008–2010	20	0	2	1	23

40 A written agreement was drafted but never signed: Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, "The History of the Green Party" (2011) <www.greens.org.nz>; Jonathan Boston and Stephen Church, "Government Formation after the 2002 General Election" in Jonathan Boston and others (eds), *New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002* (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2003) 333 at 343.

41 "The Green Party agrees to provide stability to a Labour/Progressive coalition government by cooperating on agreed policy and budget initiatives and not opposing confidence or supply for the term of this Parliament": Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, "Labour-led Government Cooperation Agreement with Greens" (press release, 17 October 2005) <www.greens.org.nz>.